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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MARY JANE 0. KLOEPFER 
' 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VS. 
CONTINENTAL ASSFRANCE 
CO~IPANY, 
Def end ant and Respondent. 
Case No. 11581 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff as bene-
ficiary under a life insurance policy on the life of her 
deceased husband to recover the proceeds of the policy. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
rrhe Court granted Defendant's Motion for Sum-
mary J udg-ment. 
RF.LH~F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the Court's 
Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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directing that judgment be entered in favor of Defen-
dant and seeks an Order of the Supreme Court direct-
ing entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff on her Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The deceased, Eldon J. Kloepfer, was an employee 
of Kloepfer Construction Company, Inc., which employ-
er held a group life policy. (Exhibit D attached to De-
fendant'a Answer). 
On March 30, 1968, decedent made application for 
insurance on his life under said Group Life In-
surance Policy. (Exhibit C attached to Defendant's 
Answer). 
That on April 11, 1968, prior to decedent's death, 
Defendant accepted said application and issued its Cer-
tificate of Insurance, post-dated, however, to May 1, 
1968, and sent said Certificate of Insurance, along with 
a cover letter dated April 11, 1968, to decedent. (Ex-
hibit A and Exhibit B attached to Plaintiff's Com-
plaint). 
Plaintiff 1s the beneficiary named in said policy. 
That with the letter and policy, Defendant mailed 
to decedent a premium notice showing a due date of 
May 1, 1968. (Part oi' Exhibit E attached to Requests 
to Admit). 
That on the night of April 11, 1968, the decedent 
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was killP-d in an airplane accident. 
That the cover letter of April 11, 1968, the Cer-
tificate of Policy and the Premium Notice were re-
ceived by Plaintiff after the decedent's death. On May 
7, 1968. she tendered the premium to Defendant (part 
of Exhibit E attached to Request to Admit), which was 
refused. 
That Plaintiff, as benerfriary, filed a claim for the 
proceeds of the policy on decedent's life, which claim 
was turn<>d down. Defendant based its denial of cov-
erabe on the grounds that the policy's effective date 
was May 1, 1968, and that hence, there was no insur-
ance in force on the date of death, April 11, 1968. This 
lawsuit followed. 
Concerning the effective date of individual poli-
cies issued under the Group Policy, Paragraph 2 (A) 
on Page LP 53936 aG of the General Provisions of said 
Group Policy states: 
Each individual eligible for insurance here-
undPr who makes written request to the Policy-
holder, on the Company's forms, to participate 
in the insurance under this Policy, and make3 the 
required pa.vment of premium, if any, shall be-
come insured subject to the following conditions: 
(A) Each such Individual must furnish, with-
out expense to the Company, evidence of 
insurabilitv satisfactory to it before he 
maY beco~e insured. if such evidence is 
submitted, and payment of the required 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
premium made, if any, the Individual's 
insurance shall become effective on the first 
of the insurance nwnth coinciding with 
or next succeeding the date the Company 
determines the evidence to be satisfactory. 
(Emphasis added). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The language in the Group Policy on the effective 
date of an individital policy is ambiguous and should 
be resolved against Defendant. 
Plaintiff contends that the policy on decedent's life 
was in full force and effect on the day of its issue, 
to-wit: April 11, 1968, notwithstanding the post-dated 
effective date arbitrarily inserted by Defendant, to-
wit: May 1, 1968, ex parte, without the insured's con-
sent or knowledge, and notwithstanding the non-pay-
ment of premium prior to said date. 
The application (Exhibit C) provides that the in-
surance 1-lhall become effective only in accordance with 
the provisions of the Group Policy (Exhibit D). 
l~xhihit D, the Group Policy, provides under Gen-
eral Provisions, Paragraph 2, Individuals Insured, Sub-
paragraph (A) (Page L P 53936 aG): 
''Each such individual must furnish, without 
expense to the Company, evidence of insurability 
satisfactory to it hefore he may become insured. 
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If any, the Individual's insurance shall become 
effective on the first day of the insurance month 
coinciding with or next succeeding the date the 
Company determines the evidence to be satisfac-
tory." (~~mphasis supplied). 
The term ''insurance month'' is not defined m 
either the application or the Group Policy. 
It :-eems logical to assume that the irnrnrance month 
begins with the date the application is approved and 
the poli<'.y issued. 
This would be April 11, 1968, pnor to decedent's 
death. 
Also, it is possible that insurance month means 
calendar month, althouri:h it would have heen easy for 
the Defendant. in drafting the Group Policy, to say 
so in plain and simple language, which would make the 
policy effective on April 1, 1968, or May 1, 1968, as 
the parties might determine by agreement. 
Here, there was no agreement as to which of sev-
eral dat1:>s would be acceptable only an ex parte arbi-
trary choice by the Defendant under the above quoted 
ambiguous language. 
Volume I of Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac-
tice, Section 10!\ page 145, after stating that the par-
ties mav fix the date upon which a policy becomes effec-
~ . 
tive, and that when a time is fixed by the parties, it 
will usually be controlling, provides: 
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"But where there is an ambiguity in the ex-
pression of the policy as to what date shall con-
trol, the courts are prone to construe such ambig-
uity against the insurer so as to allow a recoverv 
under the contract.'' · 
Plain6ff submits that there is such an ambiguity 
in this policy, contained in Paragraph 2 of General Pro-
visions set out in full above. 
This Policy uses the term "insurance month.'· 
As stated above, one interpretation of this would 
be to 11se it as synonymous with "calendar month." 
However, this must not be so, or the scrivener of the 
policy (Appellant assumes this would be the Defen-
dant) would have used the well established phrase of 
''calendar month,'' which begins on the first day of the 
month and terminates on the last day of the month. 
Also, it ia logical to interpret this pl*se to mean 
the month beginning with the day the policy is issued, 
whether it he the 1 lth day of the calendar month, the 
fifth da~', or what have you, and ending on the day be-
fore the corresponding day the next calendar month. 
If the interpretation that ''insurance month'' means 
"calendar month," is followed, then it would seem only 
common sem;e that tlil~ provisions under interpretation 
should he further construed to mean that if the evi-
dence of jnsurability is accepted prior to the middle 
of the calendar month, the effective date of the 
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poliey is the first day of that month, and if the accep-
tance i:> rna<le after the middle of the calendar month 
' the effective date is the first day of the succeeding cal-
endar month. Otherwise, why would there be a refer-
ence to two dates? 
Here, the acceptance was made on the 11th day of 
April, and under thi:-; interpretation, the policy was 
effectiYe April 1st, and the policy was in full force and 
efff'rt on the day of the insured 'H death, to-wit: April 
11, 1968 
And, if the interpretation that ''insurance month" 
means something other than calendar month is followed, 
it would seem that when the application was accepted, 
the premium paid (or waived), and the policy issued, 
that the insuranre month would begin at that time, and 
the insurance would be in force at that time, which in 
this case would be April 11, 1968, the date the policy 
was issued. 
One point stands rlear, and that is that there is 
ronsiderable ambiguity attendant to the choice of lang-
uage used hy the insurer in attempting to spell out the 
the effretive date. 
It likewise seems clear that in fixing the effective 
date as Mav 1, 1968, even though the acceptance was 
made on April 11th and the policy actually issued that 
date, the insurer acted arbitrarily and without the con-
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sent or even knowledge of the insured. 
The holding in the case of DiEnes vs. Saf eoo Life 
Company, 21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P(2) 468, is that no am-
biguous statement is to be enforced against an insured. 
In Christensen vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
21 Utah 2d 194, 443 P(2) 385, the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that any ambiguity in a policy would be uniformly 
resolved strictly against the insurer and in favor of the 
in.:;ured. 
Under this law, the policy was in full force and 
effect, :mbject to either payment or waiver of premium 
(see Point II) at the time of decedent's death. 
ARGFMENT 
POINT II 
Non-payment of premium prior to death did not 
preclude the effecti 1;eness of the insurance contract. 
A. W AIYER OF PREMIUM 
In this case, the Defendant, as a free and volun-
tary act, issued the policy on April 11, 1968, prior to the 
time tlH· first premium was paid. 
It i:.; generally well accepted that an msurer may 
waive its right to a premium. (Vol. 16 A, Appleman, 
Insurance Law and Practice. Section 9083 (1968): Loftis 
va. Pacifir; Mutual Life Insurance Company of Califor-
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nw. (Utah) 38 U. 532, 114 Pac. 134. 
And, as a rule, delivery of a policy of life insurance 
without payment of premium constitutes a waiver of 
a condition that the policy shall not be in force until 
payment of the first premium. (Annotation, 118 A.L.R. 
1072). 
Here. there appears to he no question but that the 
Policy was issued and delivered. (See Fjxhihit A, cover 
lette1· dated April 11, 1968). 
Nor does there appear to be any question concern-
ing the authority of the person making delivery to do 
so, delivery having been made by Charles 0. Finley 
and Company, Inc. (see Exhibit A), who is named as 
Admini~trator in said Policy. (See page LP 542096-4 
of Exhibit B and Notice of Premium, being part of 
F,xhibit E). 
And, an examination of Exhibit A, the cover letter 
of April l 1, 1968, deliverying the issued Policy, shows 
no mention of payment of premium as a condition of 
delivery, nor any mention of payment of premium at 
all. 
B. GRACE PERIOD 
Without in any wa~' desiring to minimize her claim 
of waiver of premium ahove asserted, but in addition 
thereto, Plaintiff desires to point out to the Court the 
Policy provisions on the grace period allowed for pay-
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ment of premiums. 
Paragraph 13 of said general provisions of the 
Group Policy (Exhibit D, Group Policy1 page LP 53936 
G-6 entitled ''Grace Period,'' provides: 
"A grace period of thirty-one days, without 
interest charge, shall be granted for the payment 
of every premium, after the first, during which 
period the insurance shall continue in force, ... '' 
The effective date of the Policy is, and the pay-
ment of premiums commences on, the ''first of the in-
surance month." (Exhibit D, Group Policy paragraph 
2A, page LP 53936 aG). 
By the plain terms of paragraph 13, the grace per-
iod of "thirty-one days ... after the first" would leave 
the policy in force on April 11, 1968, the day of death, 
under either interpretation of the effective date of the 
Policy, to-wit: April 1, 1968, or April 11, 1968. 
Pnder the first interpretation, the grace period 
would not expire until l\fa~v 2, 1968, and under the second 
interpretation the grace period would not expire until 
May 12, 1968. 
In either event, it was still running on the date of 
decedent's cleath. April 11, 1968. 
CONCLUSION 
A poHc~v on the life of decedent, issued by Defen-
dant, was in full force and effect at the time of dece-
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dent's death. Plaintiff, as the beneficiary under said 
policy, is entitled to judgment for all proceeds there-
of as prayed for in her Complaint. 
The District Court's Summary Judgment in favor 
of Defendant should be reversed and judgment on the 
Complaint entered for the Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
By 
Charles P. Olson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 
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